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Abstract— Electronic waste can cause major 
environmental harm. Obviously, a possible solution to 
this problem is to increase the volume of collected 
waste that can be recycled. This paper shows that it is 
possible to use a government funded incentive 
function to boost waste collection by manufactures as 
well as third party vendors. Using numerical analysis, 
the results show that a governmental incentive can (a) 
have a positive effect on waste recovery rate, and (b) 
further increase the reuse of the recycled material in 
the manufacturing process. 
Keywords— Government incentives, Waste electronic 
products, Recycling and treatment, Closed-loop Supply 
Chain 
1.    Introduction 
With the progress of technology, the rapid growth 
of electronic products simultaneously brought the 
dramatically increasing of waste electronic 
products, provided that they are not treated 
scientific and effectively, they will bring severe 
negative impact on the ecological environment and 
humanity health.  
Currently, fairly a few papers have studied the 
recycling and remanufacturing case of waste 
electronic products. This paper can be divided into 
two aspects:  
(1) From the macro level, some papers take the 
effect of government policy into account on 
recycling behavior of waste electronic 
products. Ref.[1] refers that, the driving factors of 
recycling the waste electronic products in China's 
electronic industry through some cases and point 
out that the policy of state subsidy can effectively 
stimulate the electronic product manufacturers to 
implement the recycling of waste electronic 
products. The authors in [2] makes a detailed 
analysis to the present situation of the recycling 
and disposal of waste electronics in developing 
countries. He found that the government played a 
decisive role in effective recovery and ecological 
treatment of waste electronic products. Ref. [3] 
refers that governments should impel and supervise 
the electronic products manufacturers and designs 
appropriate punishment for electronic products 
manufacturers so that avoids ratcheting effect. In [4] 
the authors establish the game model of 
closed-loop supply chain of waste electronic 
products and advise the government to impose a 
minimum operating tax on new electronic products, 
which can further stimulate effective recovery of 
waste electronic products. Finally a numerical 
example is given to verify the validity of the 
model. Ref.[5] refers that E-waste (discarded 
computers and electronic goods) has become a 
major environmental issue. It can be minimized by 
increasing recovery from the waste stream through 
reverse supply chains. Factor such as government 
legislation, incentive and customer demand are 
found to be the major drivers. 
Through the establishment of game model, the 
authors in [6] discuss several decision-making 
situations about the presence or absence under 
government subsidies. The research results 
illustrate that the recovery yield of Reverse Supply 
Chain will be improved through subsidies policy 
implemented by government. The authors in [7] 
analyzes the effects of governmental financial 
intervention on green supply chain competition 
using a three--stage game-theoretic model. 
Numerical results reveal that under equilibrium 
conditions, social welfare and chain-based profits 
improve by 27.8% and 306.6%, respectively, 
compared with the case without financial 
intervention.  
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(2) From the internal supply chain side, the analysis 
and research of recycling and remanufacturing of 
waste products are introduced in other papers. The 
author in [8] makes a research on the optimal 
channel structure of closed-loop supply chain based 
on remanufacturing. The result suggests that in the 
linear demand the channel structure of the retailer 
responsible for recycling is better than the 
manufacturers or the third party responsible for 
recycling; The authors in [9] makes research on the 
closed-loop supply chain of manufacturers 
responsible for recycling. The research analyzes 
and compares the efficiency of manufacturers and 
retailer under different market positions. Ref. [10] 
refers that the retail collection model analytically 
outperforms when the third-party firm is a 
non-profit organization for recycling and disposal. 
The authors in [11] discusses supply chain 
coordination as a manufacturer-retailer partnership 
based on profit sharing. 
Therefore, based on the previous research, and 
combined the government's macro regulation and 
supply chain internal system , this paper build 
closed-loop supply chain model dominated by 
manufacturer and the third party respectively. 
Suppose the government respectively sets a 
minimum rate of recycling to manufacturer and the 
third party, and takes incentive to recycle behavior 
of manufacturers and the third party. Design the 
incentive function between the government, the 
manufacturers and the third party, and respectively 
discussing the optimal strategy under the three 
cases: the case manufacturers didn't recycle, the 
case with incentive and without incentive. The 
effectiveness of incentive measures by government 
and influence of convert parameter on the recovery 
rate and the profits of chain members in supply 
chains are also analyzed. 
2.     Problem description and model      
establishment 
The authors in [12] divided the recycling channels 
of waste products in closed-loop supply chain into 
three forms ： Retailer Owned Collection ；
Manufacturer Owned Collection； Third Party 
Owned Collection. In [13],[14] the authors takes 
specific classification to closed loop supply chain 
under the electronic market environment, and the 
recovery form is specific to five forms, they are 
MRCRM(retailer selling and retailer recycling), 
MRCTM(retailer selling and the third party 
recycling), MRCM(retailer selling and 
manufacturing recycling), MCTM(manufacturing 
selling and the third party recycling), 
MCM(manufacturing selling and manufacturing 
recycling). 
Based on the theory of closed-loop supply chain, 
this paper mainly discusses the channel type by the 
third party responsible for recycling. 
MRCTM: in the forward logistics, manufacturers 
wholesale the products to retailer, then the retailer 
sells them to consumers; in reverse logistics, the 
third party is responsible for recycling electronic 
products from consumers, then provide them to 
manufacturers. The process is shown in Fig 1.1. 
 
2.1   Model assumptions and symbolic 
description 
(1) Suppose that new product can be manufactured 
by raw materials or part of waste electronic 
products, and the manufactured products are 
homogeneous. 
(2) Suppose that unit cost  is 
1C when  
manufacturer use raw materials to manufacture, the 
cost is 2c when manufacture use recycled scrap 
electronic products to manufacture ,and , 1 2c c>  ,
1 2θ c c= −  express the cost savings by using 
recycled products, the remanufacture rate of 
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recycled products is r, 0 r 1≤ ≤
.
 
(3)Suppose that the wholesale price of the product 
is w, retail price is p, consumer’s demand function 
for the product is ( )d p α βp ε= − + ,α is the 
biggest market demand, β is the sensitivity 
coefficient of consumer demand to price, ε is a 
random factor in the market, 2ε~N(0,δ ) is normal 
distribution. 
(4)Suppose that the unit costs of recycling waste 
electronic products, which the third party recycles 
from consumers, is 3c ; the price of recycling 
waste electronic products, which the manufacture 
recycle from the third party, is b,  and 
3 1 2c b c c≤ ≤ −
.
 
(5)Suppose that the fixed input cost of recycling 
waste electronic products is I(including the 
construction of recycling network, advertising and 
other costs), the recovery rate is T, and there is a 
relationship between I and T, adopting the Thierry 
express method, set up 2I kt= , k indicates the 
difficulty coefficient of recycling; the amount of 
recovery can be expressed as td(p) [15]. 
(6) When the manufacturer is responsible for 
recycling waste electronic products, manufacturer’s 
expected profit is π , and retailer’s expected profit 
is
rπ . 
   
 
(7)When the third party is responsible for the 
recovery of waste electronic products, 
manufacturer’s expected profit is 
mπ , retailer’s 
expected profit is
rπ , the third party’s expected 
profit is tπ . 
 
According to the above assumptions, it can be 
concluded that when the third party is responsible 
for the recovery of waste electronic products, the 
expected profit function of the manufacture, retailer 
and third party’s is 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )m 1 1 2 1π E w c d p c c td p r btd(p) α βp (w c θtr bt)= − + − − = − − + −  
( ) ( )rπ E p w d(p) p w (α βp)= − = − −  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 2t 3 3π E b c td p I α βp t b c kt= − − = − − −  
Therein w, b is the manufacturer's decision variable, 
p is retailer’s decision variable; t is the third party’s 
decision variable. 
2.2    Decision-making of no-recycling waste 
products 
When there is no enterprise recycling waste 
products, manufacturers can only use raw materials 
to manufacture, so, the manufacturer sets the 
wholesale price based on their own best interests, 
and the retailer sets the sales price based on the 
wholesale price to maximize their interests. So the 
specific decision model of maximum profit of 
manufacturers and retailer is as follows, 
( )m 1max π w c (α βp)= − −         (1-1) 
( )rmax π w p (α βp)= − −          (1-2) 
Let the first derivative of the P in Eq.(1-2) is 0, get 
α wp
2β 2
= +                       (1-3) 
                                             
Bring Eq.(1-3) into Eq.(1-2), solved first-order 
partial derivative to W , get； 
1
α 1
w c
2β 2
= +                      (1-4) 
                                            
Thus, the profits of manufacturers and retailers are 
2
1
m
(α βc )
π
8β
−
=                     (1-5) 
2
1
r
(α βc )
π
16β
−
=                    (1-6) 
2.3   Decision-making of recycling waste 
electronic products 
In MRCTM closed loop supply chain system, the 
supply chain members make decision analysis 
based on their own maximize profits. In the 
decentralized closed-loop supply chain, suppose 
that the manufacturer is leader, the retailer and the 
third party are followers, composing a Stackelberg 
game： a leader and more follower. In this game, in 
order to maximize their own profits, the 
manufacturer sets the wholesale price and recycling 
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price of the waste electronic products, also in order 
to maximize profits, the retailer and the third party 
set their own sales price and recovery rate 
according to the given wholesale price and the 
recycling price. According to the expected profit 
function of the three parties in 2.1, these three 
party's principal and subordinate game 
decision-making model is expressed as follows: 
( )w,b m 1max π α βp (w c θtr bt)= − − + −         (1-7) 
( )r rmax π p w (α βp)= − −         (1-8) 
( ) ( ) 2t t 3max π α βp t b c kt= − − −        (1-9) 
Using the backward induction method, the 
maximum benefit of the supply chain members is 
Optimal wholesale price ：
( ) 21 2*
2 2
3
8k α βc (rθ c ) αβ
w
16kβ (rθ c ) β
+ − −
=
− −
     (1-10) 
Optimal recovery price: 
* 3rθ cb
2
+
=
                      (1-11) 
Optimal sale price:
  ( ) 22 3*
2 2
3
8k a βc (rθ c ) αβαp
2β 32kβ 2(rθ c ) β
+ − −
= +
− −
        (1-12) 
Optimal recovery rate: 
( )1 3*
2 2
3
α βc (rθ c )
t
16k (rθ c ) β
− −
=
− −
            (1-13) 
Let(1-10),(1-11),(1-12),(1-13)into(1-7),(1-8),(1-9) 
get the profits of supply chain members 
Manufacturer profits: 
2
* 1
m
2 2
3
k(α c β)
π 18kβ β (rθ c )
2
−
=
− −
             (1-14) 
Retailer profits: 
2 2
* 1
r 2
2
3
k (α c β)
π
1
β 4k β(rθ c )
4
−
=
 
− −  
          (1-15) 
The third party’s profits 
( )2 23 1*
r 22
3
k rθ c (α c β)
π
16k (rθ c ) β
− −
=
 − − 
            (1-16) 
 
3.  Model improvement and strategy analysis 
3.1     Model improvement 
In order to realize the coordination of closed loop 
supply chain in China, through learning overseas 
successful experience, government should set a 
minimum recovery rate to manufacturers to 
constrain the recycling behavior of manufacturers. 
According to the manufacturer's performance of 
recycling wastes, the government will take 
incentive. When the recovery rate of the 
manufacturer is more than the recovery rate of the 
government regulation, the excess part will be 
rewarded, When the recovery rate of the 
manufacturer is lower than the recovery rate of the 
government regulation, the incomplete part will be 
punished. Assume that the government provides the 
incentive function: ( )L v t m d(p)= − , t is the 
actual recovery rate of the manufacturer, m is the 
incentive factor. When t m≥ , L expresses 
government's unit reward, when t m< ,L 
expresses government's unit of punishment. 
3.2    Analysis on the implementation of 
incentive policies for manufacturers 
Considering the government’s restrictions, in order 
to avoid the punishment or get the reward from 
government, the manufacturers will affect the 
retailer and the third party’s decision through 
adjusting the wholesale and recycling price of 
waste electronic products, thus achieving the better 
coordination of the supply chain. When the 
government take incentive to the manufacturer, 
manufacture’s expected profit function can be 
expressed as  
The Leader-follower game decision model of 
manufacturer, retailer and the third party is as 
follows 
      (1-17) 
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( )
( ) ( )
r
2
t 3
m ax π p w (α βp )
m ax π α βp t b c k t
= − −

= − − −
      (1-18)            
Using backward induction method, the solving 
method is the same as 2.3, get 
** α wp
2β 2
= +                        (1-19)  
** 3b c
 t (α βw)
4k
−
= −
                (1-20) 
Let (1-19),(1-20)into(1-17),and respectively solve 
partial derivation 
to w and b  
( ) ( )
( )
1 1**
2
3
2k α cβ vmβ αβ b c (b rθ v)
w
4kβ β b c (b rθ v)
+ + + − − −
=
+ − − −
        (1-21)                       
**
3
1b (rθ c v)
2
= + +
                 (1-22) 
Let (1-21),(1-22)into(1-20)get 
( )1 3**
2
3
α c β vmβ (rθ v c )
t
16k (rθ v c ) β
− − + −
=
− + −
           (1-23)                                          
Let(1-19),(1-21),(1-22),(1-23)into (1-17),(1-18),get 
2
** 1
m
2 2
3
k(α c β vmβ)
π 18kβ β (rθ v c )
2
− −
=
− + −
            (1-24)                            
2 2
** 1
r 2
2
3
k (α c β vmβ)
π
1
β 4k β(rθ v c )
4
− −
=
 
− + −  
     (1-25)                          
( )2 23 1**
t 22
3
k rθ v c (α c β vmβ)
π
16k (rθ v c ) β
+ − − −
=
 − + − 
  (1-26)                            
Compared the optimal decision of the above three 
cases . get: 
Conclusion 3.1  (1) ** *t t>  
              (2) ** *m m mπ π π> > ；  
** *
r r rπ π π> > ； ** *t tπ π>  
It can be seen from the conclusion (1) that when 
the government restrains to the manufacturer, the 
manufacturer's recycling rate will increase. 
Manufacturers, retailer, and the third party in the 
closed loop supply chain can get more profits than 
those without government restraint. 
Conclusion3.2 the supply chain, which is the 
government constrain to the manufacturer, shows 
there is a increasing relationship between the 
recovery rate T and 3(rθ v c )+ − . It means that if 
the cost of callback manufactured products can 
save more cost, the recovery will be higher. When 
the recycling price is lower, the government's 
incentive strategy can play a role; besides, the 
greater the unit incentive of the government, the 
higher the optimal recovery rate and it will more 
able to motivate the manufacturer to recycle. 
Conclusion 3.3 there is an increasing relationship 
between the income of the  supply chain members 
and 3(rθ v c )+ − , which indicates that the higher 
the cost saving of recycling and remanufacturing 
rate, the greater the government's incentive, and the 
higher the profit of the supply chain members. 
3.3     Analysis on the implementation of 
incentive policies for the third party 
Considering the government’s restrictions, in order 
to avoid the punishment or get the reward from 
government, the third party will affect the retailer 
and manufacture's decision through adjusting the 
wholesale and recycling price of waste electronic 
products, thus achieving the better coordination of 
the supply chain. When the government take 
incentive to the third party, the third party’s 
expected profit function can be expressed as
 
 
The Leader-follower game decision model of 
manufacturer, retailer and third party is as follows 
( )w ,b m 1max π α βp (w c θtr bt)= − − + −   (1-27)                            
( )r rmax π p w (a βp)= − −               (1-28) 
( ) ( ) ( )2t t 3max π α βp t b c kt v t m (α βp)= − − − + − −   (1-29) 
The solving method is the same as 2.3, get 
( )3 1**
2
3
rθ c v (α βc )
t
16k (rθ c v) β
− + −
=
− − +
           (1-30)                                   
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( ) 21 3**
2 2
3
8k α βc αβ(rθ c v)αp
2β 32kβ 2(rθ c v) β
+ − − +
= +
− − +
  (1-31)                             
** 3rθ c vb
2
+ −
=
                (1-32) 
( ) 21 1**
2 2
3
8k α βc αβ(rθ c v)
w
16kβ (rθ c v) β
+ − − +
=
− − +
    (1-33)                               
Let (1-33),(1-32),(1-31),(1-30) respectively into 
(1-27),(1-28),(1-29),get the profits of supply chain 
members： 
2
** 1
m 2 2
3
2k(α c β)
π
16kβ β (rθ c v)
−
=
− − +
(1-34)                                   
2 2
** 1
r 22
3
16k (α c β)
π
β 16k β(rθ c v)
−
=
 − − + 
  (1-35)                                
( ) ( )21 3 1
**
t 22 2
3
k(α cβ) rθ c v α cβ 4βvm 64vmk
π
16k (rθ c v) β
 
− − + − + −
 
=
 − − + 
  (1-36)             
Compared Eq. (1-13), (1-30) can be seen, when 
3(rθ c ) 0− > , ** *t t> .The following conclusions 
can be drawn: 
Conclusion 3.4 the optimal recovery of waste 
products increase with the increase of cost saving, 
and increases with the improvement of the 
remanufacturing rate. 
Conclusion 3.5 when the cost saving of waste 
products is greater than zero, the recycling rate of 
waste products under the incentive policy is greater 
than there is no incentive. namely ** *t t> . 
Conclusion 3.6 the optimal recovery rate of waste 
electronic products increases with the increase of 
the government’s unit incentive factor V. The 
greater the government’s incentive , it will be more 
able to motivate the third party’s recovery 
behavior . 
3.4    Comparison of decision making in 
supply chain members under three cases 
(1)There are two cases: no recycling of waste 
products and recycling of waste electronic products 
without incentive, 
It can be seen from Eq. (1-5),(1-14) , 
when 3rθ c 0− = ,
*
m mπ π= ; 
 
When 3(rθ c ) 0− > , **m mπ π<
 
It can be seen from Eq. (1-6),(1-15), 
when 3rθ c 0− = ,
*
r rπ π= ; 
when 3 (rθ c ) 0− > , **r rπ π<  
It can be seen from Eq.(1-16), 
when 3rθ c 0− = ,
*
tπ 0=
 
Conclusion3.7 when there is no incentive, only cost 
savings of recycling is greater than zero, namely
3(rθ c ) 0− > , the manufacturer will recycle the 
waste electronic products; when the cost saving is 
zero, the recovery rate is zero. Therefore, it is 
necessary for the government to set incentives to 
the behavior of recycling. 
(2)There are two cases of recycling waste 
electronic products: one is that government has 
incentive policy and the other is not. 
It can be known from the Eq.(1-16), (1-36): 
 
If ** *t tπ π 0− > , then: 
2 2
1 3 3(α βc ) v 2v(rθ c ) 4 16k β(rθ c v)vm   − + − > − − +   
   
(1-37) 
It can be known **t 1<
,
 
( )23 3 116k β(rθ c v) rθ c v (α βc )− − + > − + −      (1-38)                         
From Eq. (1-30) ,get, 
3 3v 2(rθ c ) 4 ( c v)m rθ+ − > − +         (1-39)              
Compared Eq. (1-14), (1-34) and Eq. (1-15), (1-35) 
can be known 
** *
m mπ π>
** *
r rπ π>  
Conclusion 3.8 when the government constrains to 
the third party, it can effectively motivate the 
recovery behavior of the third party, only the unit 
incentive factor V and the minimum recovery rate 
M satisfied the conditions 
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3 3v 2(rθ c ) 4 ( c v)m rθ+ − > − +
.
  
Conclusion 3.9 the profit of the supply chain 
members under the government’s incentive is 
greater than there is no incentive, and increases 
with the increase of the government’s unit incentive, 
so the government's incentive policy can play an 
effective role. 
4.      Numerical Example 
The following numerical study was conduct 
simulation design and analysis by adopting the 
example of closed loop supply chain of recycling 
of waste electronic products in China’s electronic 
product manufacturing industry to demonstrate the 
effect of the change of different parameters on the 
recovery rate and the profits of the members in the 
closed loop supply chain. 
In order to make the government's incentive 
effective, the value of the relevant parameters are 
in accordance with the 2.1 section parameter range, 
so it is scientific and reasonable. 1 2c c> ,
1 2 θ c c= − , 3 1 2c b c c≤ ≤ − Conditions of the 
validity of incentive:
3 3v 2(rθ c ) 4 ( c v)m rθ+ − > − +
. 
Suppose the 
relevant parameters of manufacturer, retailer and 
the third party： 1c 100= 2c 50= α 1000=
β 5= k 3000=
 
4.1     The simulation experiment of the 
government taking incentive to the manufacture 
According to the above parameters and model, the 
optimal solution is obtained as shown in table 1.2, 
table 1.1 and figure 1.2. 
Table 1.1 3c 5= ,r=0.6,m=0.3,v=10 the profits of 
supply chain members in three situations 
 
 
In table 1.1 it can be seen, the profits of recycling 
waste electronic products and remanufacturing is 
higher than not. After the government take 
incentive to the behavior of manufacturer’s 
recycling and remanufacturing, the closed-loop 
supply chain members' profits is higher than no 
recovery of waste products and no incentive when 
recycling of waste electronic products . 
In table 1.2(1) When the government take incentive 
to the behavior of manufacturer’s recycling and 
remanufacturer, manufacturer's recovery rate is 
significantly higher than the recovery rate without 
incentive, It is show that the government’s behavior 
can effectively motivate the manufacturers to 
recycle the waste electronic products. So as to 
achieve the resources recycling. 
(2)The recovery rate of the manufacturer is 
increasing with the increase of the remanufacture 
rate of product. 
(3)In the situation of government take incentive to 
manufacturers, the recovery rate of manufacturers 
is not always increase with the increase of the 
minimum recovery rate that set by the government. 
So the government should consider the actual 
situation when set the minimum recovery rate, 
utmost stimulate the recycling and remanufacturing 
behavior of manufacturers. 
(4)In the situation of the government take incentive 
to manufacturers, recovery rate of waste electronic 
products increases with the increase of the 
government unit incentive factor. 
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It can be seen from Fig1.2, the profit of 
manufacturer increases with the increasing of 
government’s unit incentive factor. Based on the 
above analysis, we can see that the government's 
incentive policy can motivate the recycling 
behavior of manufacturers and improve the profit 
of whole closed-loop supply chain system. 
4.2     The simulation experiment of the 
government taking incentive to the third party 
According to the above parameters and the model, 
the optimal solution is obtained as shown in table 
1.3, table 1.4 and figure 1.3. 
Table1.3 3c 5= ,r=0.6,m=0.3v=10 the profits of supply chain members in three cases 
 
In table 1.3 it can be seen, when recycling and 
remanufacturing, the profit of members in supply 
chain is higher than no recycling. When the 
government take incentive to the behavior of 
recycling and remanufacturing, the profits of 
members in closed-loop supply chain are higher 
than there is no recovery and no incentive
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It can be seen from Fig1.3, the profit of all 
members in closed loop supply chain is increasing 
with the increasing of the government unit 
incentive factor. It is obvious that appropriate unit 
incentive factor can effectively motivate the 
members in the supply chain. 
It can be seen from Fig1.4, (1) When the 
government takes incentive to the third party, the 
recovery rate is significantly higher than which 
without incentive 
(2)The recovery rate of waste electronic product is 
increasing with the increasing of remanufacturer, It 
is shows that the industry can improve the recovery 
rate of waste products by improving the technology 
of remanufacturing. 
It can be seen from Fig1.5、Fig1.6, (1)The third 
party’s recovery rate of waste electronic products 
increases with the increasing of the government 
unit incentive factor, this shows that the 
government's incentive strategy can effectively 
guide the third party’s recovery. 
(2)The recovery rate of waste electronic products 
decreases with the increase of unit cost of recovery. 
 
From the above analysis we can see that the 
government's incentive policy can motivate the 
recycling behavior of all members in the supply 
chain. The greater the units incentive factors of the 
government, the higher the recycling rate, and it 
can be more able to motivate the manufacturer's 
recycling behavior and improve the profit of whole 
closed-loop supply chain system. But the recovery 
rate of waste electronic products is not always 
increasing with the increasing of minimum 
recovery rate that set by the government. So the 
minimum recovery rate should be set scientific, it 
can not be blindly increasing, and should select 
appropriate recovery rate to utmost stimulate the 
recycling and remanufacturing behavior of 
manufacturers. 
5.     Conclusion 
This paper establish the model of remanufacturing 
close-loop supply chain based on the third party 
who is responsible for recycling, aim at the 
problem of low recovery rate of waste electronic 
products, design the incentive function between the 
government, the manufacturers and the third party, 
and respectively discussing the optimal strategy 
under the three cases: the case manufacturers didn’t 
recycling, the case manufactures recycling with 
government incentive and the case manufactures 
recycling without government incentive. Obtaining 
the government incentive strategy can effectively 
motivate the recycling and remanufacturing of the 
supply chain system via the effect of parameter 
variation on recovery rate and profit of supply 
chain system. Simultaneous the data suggests that, 
the greater the units incentive factors of the 
government, the higher the recycling rate, and it 
can be more able to motivate the manufacturer and 
the third party’s recycling behavior and can 
improve the profits of the whole closed-loop supply 
chain system, but the government should base on 
the actual situation when setting the minimum 
recovery rate, utmost stimulate the recycling and 
remanufacturing behavior of the manufacturer and 
the third party.
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